BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Columba Systems Ltd//NONSGML CPNG/SpringViewer/ICal Output/3.3-
 M3//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260930T123423Z
DTSTART:20261007T160000Z
DTEND:20261007T170000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - En Hua Hu (Oxford)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}g90-muo37n2
 3-av5r4m
DESCRIPTION:Title: What makes a matching market congested\n\nAuthors: Jus
 tin Hadad & En Hua Hu\n\nAbstract: We study a decentralized matching mar
 ket where each applicant sends a fixed number of applications\, and then
  firms make one offer. Our game emulates matching markets under time con
 straints: agents who are unmatched after the round remain unmatched. Con
 gestion arises from two basic market failures: some firms do not receive
  applications (an issue of coverage)\, and some applicants receive multi
 ple offers (an issue of collisions). We study how the market size\, degr
 ee of preference alignment\, and number of applications affect congestio
 n. Aligned preferences worsen congestion when there is no possibility to
  coordinate\, and additional applications do not always alleviate conges
 tion\; optimal quotas are typically small.\n\nContact: sophie.kreutzkamp
 @manchester.ac.uk
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Arthur Lewis_G.020/G.021 \, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
 
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR