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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260313T165729Z
DTSTART:20260311T170000Z
DTEND:20260311T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Omer Edhan (Manchester)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}l1u3-mmp53r
 d1-dabcg0
DESCRIPTION:Title: Lyapunov Games\n \nAuthors: Omer Edhan Idan & Ziv Hell
 man \n\nAbstract: Decentralised learning is often used to explain how pl
 ay might settle on equilibrium\, but even natural adjustment rules can p
 roduce persistent cycling. We identify broad conditions under which lear
 ning in population games does converge. The key idea is a global “progre
 ss measure” - a strict Lyapunov function - that increases along learning
  paths\, rules out cycles\, and forces long-run behaviour to settle at e
 quilibrium. We study when such Lyapunov functions exist\, linking conver
 gence to the absence of robust non-equilibrium (chain) recurrence. We al
 so give practical\, verifiable sufficient conditions via a Helmholtz-typ
 e decomposition that separates convergent and cycling components\, yield
 ing convergent dynamics well beyond the potential-game framework. Time p
 ermitting\, we discuss implications for equilibrium selection and direct
 ions for applied work. \n\nContact: sophie.kreutzkamp@manchester.ac.uk
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Williamson_4.08 Seminar Room \, Williamson Building\, Manchester
 
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