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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260313T165531Z
DTSTART:20260318T170000Z
DTEND:20260318T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Ina Taneva (Edinburgh)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}p1u2-mmp518
 lb-w5e4ha
DESCRIPTION:Title: Strategic Ignorance and Information Design\n \nAuthors
 : Ina Taneva & Thomas Wiseman\n \nAbstract: We study information design 
 in strategic settings when agents can publicly refuse to view their priv
 ate signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to vie
 w their signals may lead to substantial divergence between the designer’
 s intent and actual outcomes\, even in the case where the designer seeks
  to maximize the agents’ payoffs. We introduce the appropriate equilibri
 um concept — ignorance-permissive Bayes correlated equilibrium — and cha
 racterize implementable distributions over states and actions. The desig
 ner’s optimal response to strategic ignorance generates qualitative prop
 erties that standard information design cannot: the designer may provide
  redundant or even counterproductive information\, asymmetric informatio
 n structures may be strictly optimal in symmetric environments\, providi
 ng information conditional on players’ viewing choices rather than all a
 t once may hurt the designer\, and communication between players may hel
 p her. Optimality sometimes requires that players ignore their signals w
 ith positive probability. \n\nContact: sophie.kreutzkamp@manchester.ac.u
 k
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Williamson_4.08 Seminar Room \, Williamson Building\, Manchester
 
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