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PRODID:-//Columba Systems Ltd//NONSGML CPNG/SpringViewer/ICal Output/3.3-
 M3//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20170706T073141Z
DTSTART:20170511T130000Z
DTEND:20170511T150000Z
SUMMARY:Philosophy Research Seminar - welcome for incoming MA/PhD student
 s
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}c4-j2fyg1q2
 -7coob1
DESCRIPTION:This seminar\, which will include talks from a member of staf
 f and a current PhD student\, will form part of the School Welcome Event
  for those holding MA and PhD offers. \n\n14.00-15.00 - Fred Horton (Man
 chester)\n\n*Title: The Normativity of Deliberative Contractualism\n*Abs
 tract: Moral contractualism holds that we ought to act according to the 
 code that we would agree to in certain hypothetical\, idealised circumst
 ances. Any such theory must provide a plausible account of the normativi
 ty of such agreements – that is\, an explanation of agents’ reasons to c
 omply with this hypothetical contract. Nicholas Southwood has offered a 
 novel version of this kind of theory\, called Deliberative Contractualis
 m. Southwood argues that morality’s foundations are located in the commo
 n code we would agree to if we were deliberatively rational. To be delib
 eratively rational is to follow the deliberative norms that he takes to 
 be presuppositions of the activity of deliberation itself. Our reason to
  comply with this common code is founded on the interpersonal account of
  practical reason Southwood develops. The idea is that the normativity o
 f deliberative contractualist principles is implicit in his account of d
 eliberative agency. To have the capacities that are constitutive of deli
 berative agency presupposes that we stand in an inescapable normatively 
 significant relation to others\, and that we have reasons to express the
  demands of this relation. This paper provides a brief overview of South
 wood’s account and raises two worries\, the first concerning the nature 
 of the inescapable relation that Southwood claims all competent agents s
 tand in to each other. It seems that either the relation is going to be 
 too weak to establish the kind of normativity needed for the moral oblig
 ations Southwood wants to derive\, or it would need to rely on some othe
 r source of normativity\, which would undermine Southwood’s ambition to 
 provide an ‘explanatory rock bottom’ account of morality’s foundations. 
 Even if this can be met\, and competent agents do stand in this inescapa
 ble relation\, there is a second worry for Southwood\, namely\, whether 
 this relation implies following the deliberative norms he identifies. Th
 is worry is all the more pressing given that these norms clearly have mo
 ral content. This needn’t be a case of vicious circularity\, provided So
 uthwood can show that we can have an independent grip on deliberative no
 rmativity. I question whether he manages to demonstrate this.\n\n15.00-1
 6.00 - Catharine Abell (Manchester)\n\n*Title: What is Fiction?\n*Abstra
 ct: What distinguishes works of fiction from works of non-fiction? I arg
 ue that works of fiction are distinguished by the institutional context 
 within which they are produced. I draw on this account to illuminate bot
 h what it is to appreciate a work as fiction and the relation between fi
 ction and the imagination.
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:5.211\, University Place\, Manchester
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