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CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20230424T133645Z
DTSTART:20230426T160000Z
DTEND:20230426T170000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Paula Onuchic (Oxford)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}dsd-lcuer49
 8-ro3fjg
DESCRIPTION:Title: Disclosure and Incentive in Teams (joint with Joao Ram
 os).\n\nAbstract: We consider a team-production environment where all pa
 rticipants are motivated by career concerns\, and where a team’s joint p
 roductive outcome may have different reputational implications for diffe
 rent team members. In this context\, we characterize equilibrium disclos
 ure of team-outcomes when team-disclosure choices aggregate individual d
 ecisions through some deliberation protocol. In contrast with individual
  disclosure problems\, we show that equilibria often involve partial dis
 closure. Furthermore\, we study the effort-incentive properties of equil
 ibrium disclosure strategies implied by different deliberation protocols
 \; and show that the partial disclosure of team outcomes may improve ind
 ividuals’ incentives to contribute to the team. Finally\, we study the d
 esign of deliberation protocols\, and characterize productive environmen
 ts where effort-incentives are maximized by unilateral decision protocol
 s or more consensual deliberation procedures.\n\nMET full schedule: http
 ://daviddelacretaz.net/seminars/
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Room G.020\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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