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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230303
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230304
SUMMARY:Themes in Oppressive Language 2023
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}evw-ldehh92
 v-od8jrg
DESCRIPTION:A workshop exploring different topics in oppression and langu
 age\, organised by the Philosophy Department. This workshop is kindly su
 pported by the Mind Association and the University of Manchester Philoso
 phy Department. Whilst all of the talks will be in person there will be 
 an opportunity to attend online to watch the talks.\n\n\nTIMETABLE\n\n10
 :00 - 11:15: Stefano Predelli (University of Nottingham)\, 'Slurs\, Tabo
 o\, and the Scope of Meaning'\n\n11:20 - 12:35: Dan Zeman (University of
  Warsaw)\, 'Exocentric Uses of Slurs and Political Activism'\n\n14:00 - 
 15:15: Justina Berskyte & Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (University of Manchester)\
 , 'Incels\, Ideology and Language'\n\n15:20 - 16:35: Lucija Duda (Univer
 sity Manchester)\, '“Why so angry?”: a feminist view on the oppressive l
 anguage of arguing in Philosophy'\n\n16:40 - 17:55 Taiwo Ogunyinka (Inde
 pendent Researcher)\, 'Ontology\, Ethics and Language in Social Justice 
 Movements'\n\nABSTRACTS\n\nSTEFANO PREDELLI 'Slurs\, Taboo\, and the Sco
 pe of Meaning'\n\nI examine the phenomenon of taboo against the backgrou
 nd of standard semantic theories of slurs. In particular\, I pause on th
 e relationships between the classic non-displaceable profile of slurs an
 d the apparent 'scoping-out’ from pure quotation exhibited by taboo. I c
 onclude with a few general gestures regarding the aims and scope for the
  study of conventional meaning and of semantics.\n\n\n\nDAN ZEMAN 'Exoce
 ntric Uses of Slurs and Political Activism'\n\nThe reclamation of slurs 
 is a much-discussed issue in contemporary philosophy of language. Among 
 the many puzzles this phenomenon raises\, the question of who is entitle
 d to reclaim a slur is among the most prominent ones. The consensus in t
 he literature seems to be that slur reclamation is done by members of th
 e group the slur targets (henceforth “the target group”)\, with people o
 utside the group possibly being allowed to use the slur in this way in l
 ater stages of the process.\n\nIn a very recent paper\, Dan López de Sa 
 and Bianca Cepollaro (“Who Reclaims Slurs?”\, Pacific Philosophical Quar
 terly\, 2022) have argued that in certain cases reclamation can be done 
 people outside the target group. To support this claim\, they bring to t
 he fore cases of political activism. They discuss four such cases: women
  and straight men using “faggot” to protest fascism\; gay men using “dyk
 es” to support lesbians\; the use of “slut” in the famous slut walks\; t
 he use of “bitch” in a TV show by a male character that helps women.\n\n
 While I don’t necessarily disagree with their conclusion\, I think that 
 the examples they provide are not sufficient to support the claim\, for 
 the following reason. In the semantic literature on perspectival express
 ions like predicates of taste (“tasty”\, “funny” etc.)\, these have been
  said to have exocentric uses – when someone is using such a predicate f
 rom someone else’s perspective (e.g.\, a parent telling their child “Thi
 s puree is tasty!” or the ad of a pet store reading “We have tasty dog\,
  cat and fish food!”). These uses contrast with egocentric ones\, when o
 ne simply speaks from their own perspective (see Lasersohn 2005). The ca
 ses López de Sa and Cepollaro put forward strike me as exocentric uses o
 f slurs. In the cases of political activism they present\, those outside
  the target group simply embrace the\nperspective of those inside the gr
 oup and voice it by using the relevant slurs in reclaimed ways\, without
  assuming the identity of those in the target group – which\, arguably\,
  is what allyship in part amounts to. (Admittedly\, the fourth case they
  present is trickier because the character also applies “bitch” to himse
 lf\, but in my opinion the fact that it is a fictional example considera
 bly reduces the dialectical power of the example.)\n\nCrucially\, the co
 nsequence of interpreting such cases as exocentric uses of slurs is that
  reclamation is not\, in an interesting sense\, achieved by people outsi
 de the target group. When someone uses a predicate of taste exocentrical
 ly\, they don’t suddenly become part of the group that takes the predica
 te to apply to the object: embracing someone’s perspective does not impl
 y “counting as” the person whose perspective one embraces. (López de Sa 
 and Cepollaro object to Ritchie’s 2017 view precisely along these lines.
 ) The question of who is entitled to use a slur exocentrically for recla
 mation purposes is a legitimate one\, and here the answer given by the t
 wo authors might be right: it is those who are given the authority (in t
 he relevant contexts) to do so. However\, by reclaiming a slur\, those o
 utside the target group are merely becoming spokespeople for those in th
 e group and the means (much like a banner) by which reclamation is achie
 ved. The examples thus don’t lend the required support to their thesis.\
 n\n\n\n\nJUSTINA BERSKYTE & MIHAELA POPA-WYATT 'Incels\, Ideology and La
 nguage'\n\nIn this joint talk\, we present findings of an ongoing interd
 isciplinary project on how incel communities create and use language to 
 reinforce their identities and misogynistic ideologies. The pilot study 
 for this project is funded by The Digital Trust and Society.\n\n‘Incel’ 
 (involuntary celibate) is applied to those who desire but are unable to 
 obtain a romantic/sexual relationship. Particularly we focus on those in
 cels who blame their romantic failures on their physical looks claiming 
 that society is inherently `lookist'. In this way their failures are not
  their fault but are instead due to what they perceive as systematic soc
 ial hostility by women toward men.\n\nWe first consider why incels in su
 ch communities portray hostility towards women. Then we sketch out parts
  of incel ideology (in particular beliefs stemming from being 'red-pille
 d' or 'black-pilled') and show how this ideology helps to reconcile the 
 hostility. We then\, introduce echo-chambers\, employing Nguyen's (2020\
 , 'Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles') formulation. Lastly\, we presen
 t examples of language used by incels and suggest that certain linguisti
 c terms help to reinforce incel echo chambers by perpetuating misogyny\;
  establishing social identities\; and intra-group policing.\n\n\n\n\nLUC
 IJA DUDA '“Why so angry?”: a feminist view on the oppressive language of
  arguing in Philosophy'\n\nSome feminist argumentation scholars argue th
 at overreliance on Govier’s (1999) minimal adversariality\, i.e.\, the t
 endency to mitigate the opposition of views in philosophy through norms 
 of politeness\, renders impossible the access of marginalized philosophe
 rs to philosophy (Burrow\, 2010\; Hundleby\, 2013\; Yap\, 2020). This is
  so because the stereotypes of politeness\, which are gendered and raced
 \, influence the performative force of the arguer’s speech act\, so they
  find it difficult to produce a philosophical argument. Eventually\, giv
 en the fact that uptake is constitutive of the speech act\, they produce
  a different speech act altogether. For example\, if a white woman affec
 ted by the ‘Angry Black woman’ stereotype\, interprets a Black woman who
  raises a polite objection X as making an attack\, a Black woman actuall
 y did produce an attack instead of an objection. To avoid the injustice 
 that marginalized philosophers experience in minimally adversarial philo
 sophical argumentation\, feminist argumentation scholars suggested colla
 boration (Hundleby\, 2013\; Yap\, 2020) as an alternative philosophical 
 method\, or the self-regulating policy of adopting metadistrust (Bondy 2
 010\, Rooney 2012) towards one’s assessment of the arguments offered by 
 marginalized arguers\, especially if they are relevant to marginalized a
 rguers’ oppression.\n\nI argue that the framework which takes uptake to 
 be constitutive of the speech act\, which Yap and Hundleby endorse direc
 tly\, but is also symptomatic of Burrow’s work\, is ill-suited to descri
 be the oppressive acts of arguing in philosophy. As the theoretical fram
 ework\, the constitution theory of uptake is inappropriate for the polit
 ical goals of feminist practice. Although the goal is to reveal how sile
 ncing disadvantages arguers belonging to marginalized social groups\, th
 e theoretical machinery of speech acts which appeals to the constitution
  theory of uptake (CTU) harms the speakers whose harm is designed to ill
 uminate. First\, I argue that a feminist framework which appeals to CTU 
 perpetuates the stereotypical philosophical representation of people of 
 colour as not endowed with reason\, as aggressive\, primitive\, and emot
 ional. In this way\, it maintains the racialized and gendered regimes of
  representation in philosophy. Second\, CTU deprives marginalized speake
 rs of agency (McDonald\, 2021). By depriving marginalized philosophers o
 f the status of the agent\, feminist argumentation theory ratifies the m
 ainstream dominant boundaries of what counts as philosophy and who count
 s as a philosopher. Consequently\, it lacks to recognize as philosophica
 l and argumentative the non-traditional practices and knowledge location
 s which are important tools in reframing philosophical practice. Finally
 \, given that the framework of speech act theory locates the harm as ori
 ginating in the individual member of the audience or proponent of an arg
 ument\, it is hard to perceive that harm originates on the level of stru
 cture or the level of the institution. This is politically unpalatable f
 or feminist goals because the project which aims to inclusive philosophy
  should not rely on individual responsibility\, but instead illuminate r
 acism and sexism as structural philosophical problems\, hence challengin
 g the status quo of normative white philosophical spaces. I will show th
 at this is why solutions to problems of injustice\, such as metadistrust
  or collaboration\, are flawed.\n\n\n\n\nTAIWO OGUNYINKA 'Ontology\, Eth
 ics and Language in Social Justice Movements'\n\nIn exploring the topic 
 of Ontology\, Ethics and Language in Social Justice Movements\, the rese
 arch project 'Shifting Perspectives' asks how we can reflexively apply t
 he knowledge learned to how we intentionally shape our relational dynami
 cs through almost-live reflection. This speculative approach to research
  is grounded in positioning research as an intentional act aimed at shap
 ing social dynamics\, then applying feminist and Black feminist approach
 es to knowledge production and sharing. The talk will be an extension of
  this process\, by presenting the rationale for my approach and how this
  has affected the knowledge gathered to date. Through the Q+A\, I hope t
 o engage in critique and reflection of the presented items as an intenti
 onal act of developing knowledge\, then reflexively\, briefly discuss as
  a group our thoughts on the whole session as an act of knowledge sharin
 g and production.  This talk will be a lived reflection on the topic of 
 the talk itself.\n\n\n\nPRICE\nFree\n\n\nREGISTRATION\nTo register pleas
 e email Justina Berskyte (justina.berskyte@manchester.ac.uk). Please ind
 icate whether you would like to attend in person or online. 
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:2.3\, Roscoe Building\, Manchester
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