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PRODID:-//Columba Systems Ltd//NONSGML CPNG/SpringViewer/ICal Output/3.3-
 M3//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20231120T101335Z
DTSTART:20231121T170000Z
DTEND:20231121T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Jack Fanning (Brown)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}j1tl-llw4yg
 3h-n3lzol
DESCRIPTION:Title: Reputation and competitive selection (joint with Joyee
  Deb)\n\nAbstract: We demonstrate how selection in competitive markets c
 an severely impede reputational incentives. Reputational equilibria\, wh
 ere consumers select firms based on their reputation for quality\, canno
 t exist when there is almost-free entry. We consider a setting in which 
 competent firms can exert costly effort to improve expected quality of o
 utput and inept firms cannot. Unfettered competition would eventually se
 lect a monopolist with an arbitrarily high reputation for competence\, r
 uling out subsequent effort incentives\, and causing even initial effort
  incentives to unravel. Intermediate entry barriers can provide greater 
 effort incentives than both unfettered competition and no competition\, 
 suggesting a non-monotonic effect of entry barriers on reputational ince
 ntives.\n\nManchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule: http://daviddelacr
 etaz.net/seminars/\n\nSpeaker website: https://sites.google.com/a/brown.
 edu/jfanning/jack-fanning
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Boardroom 2.016\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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