Research Seminar: Dr Frederique Janssen- Lauret (Manchester)
| Dates: | 27 September 2017 |
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| Times: | 15:15 - 17:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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Title: Russell, Quine, Lewis: Analytic Philosophy, Ontology and Systematicity
Abstract: In 1901, Russell expressed his 'great hopes' for a new, highly systematic philosophy, borrowing its methods from the latest developments in mathematics and physics. Were his hopes realised? More than a century later, some say we are in a heyday of systematic philosophy, typified the possible-world ontology of Lewis, `the most systematic philosopher since Leibniz'. But all is not as it seems. In this paper I will show that Lewis's ontology and ontological methods are systematic insofar as they're inherited from the systematic philosophy of his teacher Quine and answering Quinean questions. But other parts of Lewis's system are assumed without argument---physicalism, singular reference---and do not always cohere well with each other; for instance, Lewis's account of radical translation is framed in non-physicalist terms, and his Ramseyan account of theoretical terms pushes towards inscrutability of reference. Lewis's remarks about philosophical methodology in his published work and correspondence also pull in different directions, sometimes towards letting common sense have the final word, sometimes towards deferring to science. Influences from Armstrong and his interpretation of Moore explain the common-sense leanings to some extent, but I argue that even on a charitable reading the resulting picture does not add up to a systematic approach to philosophy and its methods.
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