MET Seminar - Jorgen Kratz (York)
| Dates: | 18 October 2023 |
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| Times: | 17:00 - 18:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Current University students |
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Title: Weak Misrepresentations in College Admissions (joint with Makoto Shimojo)
Abstract: Much of the literature on admission mechanisms for schools and universities is focused on "strategy-proof" mechanisms. These mechanisms assign, e.g., students to universities in a way that students' best application strategy is to rank the universities in accordance with their true preferences. Students can try to strategically misrepresent their true preferences in a number of ways, but this would never help them get into a more desirable university under a strategy-proof mechanism. This paper focuses on a particular type of misrepresentation commonly observed in practice, called "weak misrepresentations", and on mechanisms with the property that any student misrepresenting their preferences in this way is assigned to the same univerity they would have been assigned to under truth-telling. We show that a mechanism is strategy-proof if and only if it has this property. We highlight the usefulness of this characterisation by using it to prove that "re-matching mechanisms" are never strategy-proof and by providing a simple new proof of the strategy-proofness of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism.
Manchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule: http://daviddelacretaz.net/seminars/
Speaker website: https://www.york.ac.uk/economics/people/jorgen-kratz/
Travel and Contact Information
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Boardroom 2.016
Arthur Lewis Building
Manchester
