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 M3//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20151001T162034Z
DTSTART:20151027T150000Z
DTEND:20151027T170000Z
SUMMARY:Philosophy Research Seminar: Alfred Mele (Florida State)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}m7j-if5dhw4
 a-epoht9
DESCRIPTION:"Two libertarian theories: or why event-causal libertarians s
 hould prefer my daring libertarian view to Robert Kane’s view"\n\nLibert
 arianism about free will is the conjunction of two theses: the existence
  of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism\, and at lea
 st some human beings sometimes exercise free will (act freely). Some lib
 ertarian views – so-called event-causal views – appeal to indeterministi
 c causation by events and states. This article explores the relative mer
 its of two different views of this kind. One is Robert Kane’s well-known
  view\, and the other is the “daring libertarian” view I floated in Free
  Will and Luck. I say “floated” because I am not a libertarian. I do not
  endorse incompatibilism\; instead\, I am agnostic about it. But if I we
 re a libertarian\, I would embrace my daring libertarian view. This pape
 r’s thesis is that event-causal libertarians should prefer my daring lib
 ertarian view to Kane’s “dual or multiple efforts” view. Special attenti
 on is paid to a problem that luck poses for libertarian theories – a pro
 blem that Kane and I attempt to solve in different ways.
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Lecture Theatre A\, Zochonis Building\, Manchester
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