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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20231104T203944Z
DTSTART:20231115T170000Z
DTEND:20231115T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Antoine Loeper (Carlos III\, Madrid)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}q1tk-llw4x4
 8h-muxc8z
DESCRIPTION:Title: Legislative priorities and the structure of government
  (joint with Wiola Dziuda)\n\nAbstract: Why do voters often elect govern
 ments in which several parties share power? To answer that question\, we
  propose a dynamic model of elections and policy making in which in ever
 y period\, a representative voter decides whether to elect a unified gov
 ernment---in which a single party controls policy making---or a divided 
 government---in which the agenda and veto powers are held by different p
 arties. The elected government then observes a common shock to the playe
 rs' preferences\, and decides which of two policy dimensions to reform\,
  if any. On the consensual policy dimension\, both parties and the voter
  have congruent preferences (e.g.\, infrastructure)\, whereas on the div
 isive dimension (e.g.\, taxation)\, they disagree with positive probabil
 ity: party l (r) has more leftist (rightist) preferences than the voter.
  Crucially\, the government faces an agenda constraint in that it can ch
 ange only one dimension of the status quo\, which is inherited from the 
 previous government.\nWe show that a divided government leads more often
  to gridlock. However\, the voter elects a divided government\, because 
 she fears that a unified government will waste its legislative time on d
 ivisive reforms in line with its own ideology\, which may crowd out pote
 ntially beneficial consensual reforms.\n\nManchester Economic Theory (ME
 T) schedule: http://daviddelacretaz.net/seminars/\n\nSpeaker website: ht
 tps://sites.google.com/view/antoineloeper/
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Boardroom 2.016\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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