Development Economics Seminar: Selim Gulesci (Bocconi University)
|Dates:||15 November 2016|
|Times:||13:00 - 14:00|
|What is it:||Seminar|
|Organiser:||School of Social Sciences|
Title: Moral hazard: Experimental Evidence from Sharecropping Contracts.
Abstract: One of the most commonly cited explanations for low agricultural productivity in developing countries is the prevalence of sharecropping. In this project, we are randomly assigning tenancy contracts in a way which allows the estimation of (dis)incentive effects of sharecropping. We are collaborating with an NGO, BRAC, that is leasing land to young female farmers. We induce random variation in the contract structure under which the land is let: while some farmers are allowed to keep 50% of their output, some are allowed to keep a larger share, and some are provided with a monetary transfer (along with 50% of their output). The experimental design allows us to disentangle the incentive effect of the higher crop-share from its income effect.
Organisation: Bocconi Univeristy
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