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METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20170919T084854Z
DTSTART:20170927T150000Z
SUMMARY:Mitchell Centre Seminar Series
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}rwq-j7rcy8x
 e-bl8uy5
DESCRIPTION:Eduardo Gallo\, University of Cambridge\n\nStrongly connected
  cooperative elites\n\nThe sustenance of cooperative behavior is fundame
 ntal for the prosperity of human societies. Empirical studies show that 
 high cooperation is frequently associated with the presence of strong so
 cial ties\, but they are silent on whether a causal mechanism exists\, h
 ow it operates\, and what features of the social environment are conduci
 ve to its emergence. Here we show experimentally that strong ties increa
 se cooperation and welfare by enabling the emergence of a close-knit and
  strongly bound cooperative elite. Crucially\, this cooperative elite is
  more prevalent in social environments characterized by a large payoff d
 ifference between weak and strong ties\, and no gradation in the process
  of strengthening a tie. These features allow cooperative individuals to
  adopt an all or nothing strategy to tie strengthening based on the well
 -known mechanism of direct reciprocity: participants become very selecti
 ve by forming strong ties only with other cooperative individuals and se
 vering ties with everyone else. Once formed\, these strong ties are pers
 istent and enhance cooperation. A dichotomous society emerges with coope
 rators prospering in a close-knit\, strongly bound elite\, and defectors
  earning low payoffs in a weakly connected periphery. Methodologically\,
  our setup provides a framework to investigate the role of the strength 
 of ties in an experimental setting.\n
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:A114\, Samuel Alexander Building\, Manchester
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