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 M3//EN
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CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20240415T120149Z
DTSTART:20240417T160000Z
DTEND:20240417T170000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Christopher Sandmann (LSE)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}s2de-lpjokz
 wo-s86ybs
DESCRIPTION:Title: Market Structure and Adverse Selection (joint with Dak
 ang Huang)\n\nAbstract: This paper presents a unified perspective on mul
 ti-contracting in markets afflicted by adverse selection. We subsume the
  polar cases of exclusive and nonexclusive competition by introducing th
 e concept of a market structure: a trading rule that specifies the subse
 t of sellers with whom buyers can jointly trade. Normative results singl
 e out the “1+1” market structure\, where buyers trade with one seller fr
 om each of two subgroups. If adverse selection is severe\, adopting the 
 “1+1” market structure Pareto-improves upon the exclusive equilibrium al
 location. When\, in addition\, purchases must include a contract exceedi
 ng a minimum quantity\, the equilibrium allocation is second-best effici
 ent.\n\nManchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule: http://daviddelacreta
 z.net/seminars/\n\nSpeaker website: https://sites.google.com/site/christ
 opherpsandmann/home
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Boardroom 2.016\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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