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 M3//EN
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CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20240305T123921Z
DTSTART:20240313T170000Z
DTEND:20240313T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Harry Pei (Northwestern)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}t246-lnopn1
 3c-p8cyc7
DESCRIPTION:Title: Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records\n\nAbstr
 act: I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players
  can erase signals from their records. When players are sufficiently lon
 g-lived and have strictly dominant actions\, they will play their domina
 nt actions with probability close to one in all equilibria. When players
 ’ expected lifespans are intermediate\, there exist purifiable equilibri
 a with a positive level of cooperation in the submodular prisoner’s dile
 mma but not in the supermodular prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore\, the maxi
 mal level of cooperation a community can sustain is not monotone with re
 spect to players’ expected lifespans and the complementarity in players’
  actions can undermine their abilities to sustain cooperation.\n\nLink t
 o paper: https://sites.northwestern.edu/harrypei/files/2024/01/main_text
 .pdf\n\nManchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule: http://daviddelacreta
 z.net/seminars/\n\nSpeaker website: https://sites.northwestern.edu/harry
 pei/
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Boardroom 2.016\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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