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METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20230927T120014Z
DTSTART:20231004T160000Z
DTEND:20231004T170000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Artyom Jelnov (Ariel)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}u1tg-llw4qn
 ac-48cw0m
DESCRIPTION:Title: Lobbying under conflicting interests (joint with Doron
  Klunover)\n\nAbstract:\nA variation of a cheap talk game is considered 
 in which the preferences of a special interest group conflict with those
  of a policymaker if she is benevolent\; however\, she may be corrupt. T
 he interest group\, which knows the state of the world\, sends a message
  to the policymaker and may also exert costly lobbying effort for its pr
 eferred policy to be adopted. We show that expected welfare\, which is t
 he same in all PBE\, is decreasing in the probability that the policymak
 er is corrupt. Surprisingly\, it decreases faster when this probability 
 is above one-half\, suggesting that corrupt behavior will be tolerated o
 nly up to a certain level.\n\nManchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule:
  http://daviddelacretaz.net/seminars/\n\nSpeaker website: https://artyom
 jelnov.weebly.com/
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Boardroom 2.016\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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