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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20190328T094736Z
DTSTART:20190220T150000Z
DTEND:20190220T170000Z
SUMMARY:Departmental Seminar: Ms Leonie Smith (Manchester) and Ms Penelop
 e Orr (Manchester)
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 wh-vqe2ia
DESCRIPTION:Leonie Smith's Title\n*Epistemic self-defence: flipping the n
 arrative of addressing epistemic injustice\n\nLeonie Smith's Abstract\n*
 In this paper I ask: when it comes to resisting epistemic oppression\, w
 hat might those experiencing it permissibly and practically do to protec
 t themselves from harm?\n\nA person experiences an epistemic injustice w
 hen she is harmed in her capacity as a knower\, as a result of prejudice
 . Call the individuals who are subject to these injustices\, ‘marginalis
 ed knowers’ and those who perpetuate them\, ‘dominant knowers’. The lite
 rature on epistemic injustice has predominantly focused on (i) identifyi
 ng the various forms and practices of epistemic injustice [Fricker\, 200
 7\; Hookway\, 2010\; Dotson 2011\; 2012\; 2014\; Pohlhaus\, 2013\; Davis
 \, 2016\, 2018\; Berenstain\, 2016\; Archer and Smith\, forthcoming]\; (
 ii) discussing what dominant knowers can do to stop themselves perpetuat
 ing it [individually and / or structurally\, e.g.\, Anderson\, 2012]\; a
 nd (iii) lobbying for recognition of the particular capabilities and ins
 ight of marginalised knowers [e.g.\, Medina\, 2013].\n\nHowever\, this f
 ocus on persuading and educating dominant knowers to reduce epistemic in
 justice has meant that the perspective of marginalised knowers in resist
 ing epistemic injustice for themselves has been almost entirely overlook
 ed. In this paper I lay out the groundwork for an account in which we be
 gin to address that serious and significant gap. This is an account of a
  new concept of epistemic self-defence: the legitimate practice by margi
 nalised knowers of intentional cognitive manipulation of dominant knower
 s in order to prevent\, address\, or minimise the impact of epistemic in
 justice.\n\nI propose two initial primary strategies:\n\n(a)    epistemi
 c nudging (combining tools from epistemic paternalism and ethical nudgin
 g)\; and\n\n(b)   epistemic negotiation (combining corporate sales and h
 ostage negotiation tactics).\n\nRaising and addressing some possible con
 cerns with this new field of epistemic self-defence\, I argue that when 
 it comes to (often localised) epistemic self-defence there is a great de
 al more to be said about what those of us who are marginalised knowers m
 ight effectively do\, and about what we might permissibly do. Reframing 
 the issue of epistemic injustice in this way allows us to give at least 
 some control back to marginalised knowers\, offering real solutions to t
 hose knowers in a fundamentally epistemically unjust world.\n\nPenelope 
 Orr's Title\n*Visual Perspective and Primitive Self-Awareness\n\nPenelop
 e Orr's Abstract\n*This paper investigates a form of pre-reflective self
 -consciousness. In particular\, I ask whether visual experience is self-
 locating? I.e.\, is it true that\, purely in virtue of its perspectival 
 character\, visual experience can represent the location of the perceive
 r as the location from which she perceives? The idea is that when someon
 e perceives the objects in their environment they experience them as sta
 nding in spatial relations to themselves. So\, in addition to the object
 s and their spatial location\, the perceivers own location is among the 
 things represented by the experience. Some philosophers – notably\, Chri
 stopher Peacocke (2000\, 2014) and Quassim Cassam (1994) – have assumed 
 that visual experience is self-locating in this sense\, yet the claim is
  rarely argued for explicitly. In this paper\, I argue that the most nat
 ural interpretation of the perspectival structure of visual experience s
 uggests that visual representations are\, in fact\, selfless. I also con
 sider the main argument in favour of self-location – a paper by John Sch
 wenkler (2014) – and go on to show that this argument is inadequately mo
 tivated. 
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:2.16/17\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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