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 M3//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20170321T173026Z
DTSTART:20170328T120000Z
DTEND:20170328T130000Z
SUMMARY:Environmental Economics Seminar: Till Requate (Kiel University)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}x2n-iyaaq8a
 o-cw1geq
DESCRIPTION:Title: Asymmetry Enhances Success Chances for International C
 limate Change Negotiations\n \nAbstract:\n \nFighting climate change\, i
 n particular mitigating CO2 emissions is a global public good characteri
 zed by several dimensions\, notably heterogeneity between the parties in
 volved. It is often argued that such heterogeneity between countries is 
 a major obstacle for cooperative climate policy. We challenge this belie
 f by experimentally simulating two important heterogeneities: asymmetry 
 in wealth and asymmetry in loss when dangerous climate change occurs. We
  find that under loss asymmetry the success rate in reaching sufficient 
 mitigation to prevent catastrophic climate change is higher than under s
 ymmetric conditions. We also observe that neither asymmetric endowment n
 or the combination of endowment and loss asymmetries lead to different s
 uccess rates than under symmetry. Our findings suggest that asymmetries 
 may facilitate rather than hinder successful international climate polic
 y negotiations.
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:G.33\, Williamson Building\, Manchester
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