Strategic Behaviour in Choice Experiments
| Dates: | 22 April 2015 |
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| Times: | 13:00 - 14:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Adults, Current University students |
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Speaker: Professor Susan Chilton, Newcastle University
Title: Strategic Behaviour in Choice Experiments
Abstract:
This paper reports theoretical, simulation, and experimental evidence that choice
experiments are unlikely to generate reliable demand estimates when (a) the choices
are for a public good; and (b) choices are elicited using the repeated trinary choice
mechanism. The result is due to the incentive properties of the choice mechanism in
a public goods environment. The effects of the incentives for strategic non-demand
revelation are exacerbated by the mathematics of combinatorial choice set design.
The problem is endemic to choice experiment mechanisms of this type.
Please note that lunch is available from 12.45pm
More information is available at:
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/subjects/economics/our-research/workshop-and-seminars/environmental-and-resource-economics/
Travel and Contact Information
Find event
3.008
Arthur Lewis Building
Manchester
