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 M3//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20240304T035012Z
DTSTART:20240306T170000Z
DTEND:20240306T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Ángel Hernándo-Veciana (Carlos III\, Madrid)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}y1tp-llw59f
 yr-m0mrtv
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Market for Lemons under Regularity\n\nAbstract: In
  this paper\, we conduct an investigation on a competitive version of th
 e market for lemons using the tools of mechanism design. Our main contri
 bution is two fold. First\, we provide regularity conditions under which
  the constraint efficient (i.e. second best) is particularly simple. It 
 can be implemented either with a competitive equilibrium or a price floo
 r with uniform rationing\, depending on the strength of adverse selectio
 n and the elasticities of demand and supply. We also investigate optimal
  subsidies and quantity withdrawals and discuss the role of screening. S
 econd\, we introduce new techniques based on generalisations of mean pre
 serving spreads/concentrations that are essential to derive our regulari
 ty conditions and that apply more generally to mechanism design problems
 .\n\nManchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule: http://daviddelacretaz.n
 et/seminars/\n\nSpeaker website: https://sites.google.com/view/angelhern
 andoveciana
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Boardroom 2.016\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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