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METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20230313T113250Z
DTSTART:20230315T170000Z
DTEND:20230315T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Sinem Hidir (Warwick)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}ysa-lcuenk8
 w-unql36
DESCRIPTION:Title: When to go negative? (joint with Xueying Zhao)\n\nAbst
 ract: We consider the problem of an incumbent politician who decides whe
 ther to use negative advertising against a competitor to persuade voters
 . There is uncertainty about two independent parameters which are the ab
 ility and corruption of the competitor. The incumbent has a private sign
 al about the ability of the competitor and knows the voters will also le
 arn about it before voting. He decides whether to disclose an additional
  signal (going negative) about the corruption of the competitor. We focu
 s on the separating equilibrium in which the advantaged incumbent does n
 ot go negative while the disadvantaged one does. As the ability of the c
 ompetitor increases\, the probability of going negative increases for bo
 th types. As the precision of the incumbent’s private signal increases\,
  the disadvantaged incumbent goes negative more often while the advantag
 ed incumbent goes negative less often. We then relax the assumption that
  the signal is fixed and solve for the optimal persuasion in this signal
 ling environment. \n\nMET full schedule: http://daviddelacretaz.net/semi
 nars/
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Room G.020\, Arthur Lewis Building\, Manchester
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