BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Columba Systems Ltd//NONSGML CPNG/SpringViewer/ICal Output/3.3-
 M3//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20251201T225329Z
DTSTART:20251203T170000Z
DTEND:20251203T180000Z
SUMMARY:MET Seminar - Spyros Galanis (Durham)
UID:{http://www.columbasystems.com/customers/uom/gpp/eventid/}z17e-mhyuyv
 c5-edpvma
DESCRIPTION:Title: Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquis
 ition\n \nAuthors: Spyros Galanis & Sergei Mikhalishchev \n \nAbstract: 
 We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model with partial
 ly informed traders. Ostrovsky [2012] showed that ‘separable’ securities
  aggregate information in all equilibria\, however\, determining whether
  a security is separable requires knowing the exact information structur
 e of agents. To remedy this problem\, we allow traders to acquire signal
 s with cost ?\, in every period. We show that ‘? separable securities’ c
 haracterize information aggregation and\, as the cost decreases\, almost
  all securities become ? separable\, irrespective of the traders’ initia
 l private information. Moreover\, the switch to ? separability happens n
 ot gradually but discontinuously\, hence even a small decrease in costs 
 can result in a security aggregating information. We provide a complete 
 classification of securities in terms of how well they aggregate informa
 tion\, which surprisingly depends only on their payoff structure. \n\nCo
 ntact: sophie.kreutzkamp@manchester.ac.uk
STATUS:TENTATIVE
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
CLASS:PUBLIC
LOCATION:Williamson_4.08 Seminar Room \, Williamson Building\, Manchester
 
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR