MET Seminar - Ji Hee Yoon (UCL)
| Dates: | 19 April 2023 |
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| Times: | 17:00 - 18:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Current University students |
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Title: Design of Market-Clearing Technology (with C. Lyu and M. Rostek)
Abstract: Technological developments have spurred interest in innovation on multi-asset market-clearing mechanisms. This paper examines the corresponding design problem in a family of designs with rich cross-asset demand conditioning. We show that a suitably designed market-clearing technology can improve efficiency relative to the independent clearing of all assets. We also identify a subclass of designs that can be equivalently implemented as dynamic designs that do not require an investment in technology that clears multiple assets simultaneously. Efficient designs may involve withholding or delayed disclosure or price data in their dynamic implementation. Our results qualify in what markets investments in different market clearing technologies are worthwhile.
MET full schedule: http://daviddelacretaz.net/seminars/
Contact: david.delacretaz@manchester.ac.uk
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Room G.020
Arthur Lewis Building
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