Philosophy Research Seminar: Jess Leech (Sheffield)
|Starts:||15:00 17 Nov 2015|
|Ends:||17:00 17 Nov 2015|
|What is it:||Seminar|
|Organiser:||School of Social Sciences|
|Who is it for:||University staff, Alumni, Current University students|
"The Mereology of Representation"
Kant famously distinguishes between two kinds of representation: intuitions and concepts. Intuitions, he tells us, are singular and immediate, whilst concepts are general and mediate. Attempts to defend and develop this distinction, thus understood, have met with variable success. However, Kant's arguments for the conclusion that our representations of space and time are intuitions, not concepts, draw on mereological features of these representations. After a brief review of the Kantian background, I aim to explore two broad questions. First, in what sense or senses can representations have parts? And how should we (if we can) understand a difference between kinds of representation - say between intuitions and concepts - in terms of their mereological structures?
Travel and Contact Information
Lecture Theatre C