Speaker: William D. Ferguson, Gertrude B. Austin Professor of Economics Grinnell College
Why do well-meaning developmental policies so often fail? Consider the recent collapse of the well-constructed peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC guerillas. Likewise, privatizing former Soviet assets in Russia engendered authoritarian kleptocracy. In such cases, self-interested activity of powerful agents undermines policy initiatives. Alas, achieving inclusive development entails resolving dense collective-action problems of forging cooperation among agents with disparate resources, interests, and understandings. Resolution requires functional configurations of inclusive informal and formal institutions. Yet powerful actors shape institutional evolution in their favor—because they can. How to proceed? In this talk, I will outline elements of a conceptual framework for policy-relevant inquiry into such dilemmas. I will open with background for systematically conceptualizing power, social dilemmas, and four interrelated types of agency: leadership, following, brokerage, and institutional entrepreneurship. I will focus on the latter. Institutional entrepreneurs invest resources into discovering actions and narratives that can influence various political-economic and normative understandings that motivate and guide strategic interactions. Institutional entrepreneurship thus alters myriad trajectories of institutional evolution and, by extension, prospects for resolving developmental dilemmas. Moreover, these dynamics operate within specific social contexts framed by identifiable distinctions in configurations of power. Policymakers beware. This systematic approach to power, and agency facilitates inquiry into the roots and consequences of context-specific developmental dilemmas. As such, it offers conceptual foundation for developmental policy inquiry and analysis.
William Ferguson is the Gertrude B. Austin Professor of Economics at Grinnell College. After earning a B.A. in history at Grinnell College, he worked as an urban community organizer before earning a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in 1989, the year he began teaching at Grinnell College. His early scholarship focused on labor economics, emphasizing bargaining theory and collective action. Later, he broadened his focus to game theoretic political economy. His 2013 Stanford UP book, Collective Action and Exchange: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Contemporary Political Economy, addresses microfoundations of collective-action problems, power, institutions, policymaking, and growth. His 2020 Stanford sequel, The Political Economy of Collective Action, Inequality, and Development, uses a typology of political settlements to analyze collective-action problems of political-economic development. He continued this theme as a coauthor of the 2022 Oxford book Political Settlements and Development: Theory, Evidence, Implications. His 2023 Global Policy paper “Power and Public Authority” outlines a theory of triadic power. His 2026 book, for the Cambridge UP Elements in Development Economics series, continues these themes emphasizing norms, social identities, and institutional entrepreneurship. Open access: Developmental Dilemmas: The Role of Power and Agency.
