AI-Fun Seminar | Robert Loftin: Learning, Negotiation and Cooperation in Differentiable Games
|14 February 2024
|10:30 - 11:30
|What is it:
|Faculty of Science and Engineering
|Who is it for:
|University staff, External researchers, Current University students
|Dr Robert Loftin
The Manchester Centre for AI Fundamentals is hosting a series of seminars featuring expert researchers working in the fundamentals of AI.
On 14 February, Dr Robert Loftin joins us from The University of Sheffield with a talk titled 'Learning, Negotiation and Cooperation in Differentiable Games'.
In tasks that require a high degree of cooperation between independent agents, success often on the ability of these agents to adapt to one another’s behavior. Simultaneous adaptation, however, can prevent agents from converging to a fixed joint strategy at all, let alone an optimal strategy. To address this issue, we can model cooperative learning as a Stackelberg competition, in which the “leader” agent selects the strategy that maximizes its own payoff given that the “follower” agent will choose their best response to this strategy. In this talk I will discuss recent work on the problem of "uncoupled" learning of Stackelberg solutions in differentiable games. In the uncoupled setting, individual learners are only aware of their own utility functions, and have limited information about their partner's learning strategy. This requires the leader to estimate the follower's best-response function using only their observable behavior. It also requires a mechanism by which agents can "negotiate" who will lead and who will follow. This talk will present a new learning algorithm that addresses both of these issues. I will also discuss the value of differentiable games as a model of long-term human-AI cooperation, and the implications of theoretical results in such games for the larger problem of building cooperative AI.
Dr Robert Loftin
Role: Lecturer in Machine Learning
Organisation: University of Sheffield
Travel and Contact Information
Christabel Pankhurst Building