A workshop exploring different topics in oppression and language, organised by the Philosophy Department. This workshop is kindly supported by the Mind Association and the University of Manchester Philosophy Department. Whilst all of the talks will be in person there will be an opportunity to attend online to watch the talks.
TIMETABLE
10:00 - 11:15: Stefano Predelli (University of Nottingham), 'Slurs, Taboo, and the Scope of Meaning'
11:20 - 12:35: Dan Zeman (University of Warsaw), 'Exocentric Uses of Slurs and Political Activism'
14:00 - 15:15: Justina Berskyte & Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (University of Manchester), 'Incels, Ideology and Language'
15:20 - 16:35: Lucija Duda (University Manchester), '“Why so angry?”: a feminist view on the oppressive language of arguing in Philosophy'
16:40 - 17:55 Taiwo Ogunyinka (Independent Researcher), 'Ontology, Ethics and Language in Social Justice Movements'
ABSTRACTS
STEFANO PREDELLI 'Slurs, Taboo, and the Scope of Meaning'
I examine the phenomenon of taboo against the background of standard semantic theories of slurs. In particular, I pause on the relationships between the classic non-displaceable profile of slurs and the apparent 'scoping-out’ from pure quotation exhibited by taboo. I conclude with a few general gestures regarding the aims and scope for the study of conventional meaning and of semantics.
DAN ZEMAN 'Exocentric Uses of Slurs and Political Activism'
The reclamation of slurs is a much-discussed issue in contemporary philosophy of language. Among the many puzzles this phenomenon raises, the question of who is entitled to reclaim a slur is among the most prominent ones. The consensus in the literature seems to be that slur reclamation is done by members of the group the slur targets (henceforth “the target group”), with people outside the group possibly being allowed to use the slur in this way in later stages of the process.
In a very recent paper, Dan López de Sa and Bianca Cepollaro (“Who Reclaims Slurs?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2022) have argued that in certain cases reclamation can be done people outside the target group. To support this claim, they bring to the fore cases of political activism. They discuss four such cases: women and straight men using “faggot” to protest fascism; gay men using “dykes” to support lesbians; the use of “slut” in the famous slut walks; the use of “bitch” in a TV show by a male character that helps women.
While I don’t necessarily disagree with their conclusion, I think that the examples they provide are not sufficient to support the claim, for the following reason. In the semantic literature on perspectival expressions like predicates of taste (“tasty”, “funny” etc.), these have been said to have exocentric uses – when someone is using such a predicate from someone else’s perspective (e.g., a parent telling their child “This puree is tasty!” or the ad of a pet store reading “We have tasty dog, cat and fish food!”). These uses contrast with egocentric ones, when one simply speaks from their own perspective (see Lasersohn 2005). The cases López de Sa and Cepollaro put forward strike me as exocentric uses of slurs. In the cases of political activism they present, those outside the target group simply embrace the
perspective of those inside the group and voice it by using the relevant slurs in reclaimed ways, without assuming the identity of those in the target group – which, arguably, is what allyship in part amounts to. (Admittedly, the fourth case they present is trickier because the character also applies “bitch” to himself, but in my opinion the fact that it is a fictional example considerably reduces the dialectical power of the example.)
Crucially, the consequence of interpreting such cases as exocentric uses of slurs is that reclamation is not, in an interesting sense, achieved by people outside the target group. When someone uses a predicate of taste exocentrically, they don’t suddenly become part of the group that takes the predicate to apply to the object: embracing someone’s perspective does not imply “counting as” the person whose perspective one embraces. (López de Sa and Cepollaro object to Ritchie’s 2017 view precisely along these lines.) The question of who is entitled to use a slur exocentrically for reclamation purposes is a legitimate one, and here the answer given by the two authors might be right: it is those who are given the authority (in the relevant contexts) to do so. However, by reclaiming a slur, those outside the target group are merely becoming spokespeople for those in the group and the means (much like a banner) by which reclamation is achieved. The examples thus don’t lend the required support to their thesis.
JUSTINA BERSKYTE & MIHAELA POPA-WYATT 'Incels, Ideology and Language'
In this joint talk, we present findings of an ongoing interdisciplinary project on how incel communities create and use language to reinforce their identities and misogynistic ideologies. The pilot study for this project is funded by The Digital Trust and Society.
‘Incel’ (involuntary celibate) is applied to those who desire but are unable to obtain a romantic/sexual relationship. Particularly we focus on those incels who blame their romantic failures on their physical looks claiming that society is inherently `lookist'. In this way their failures are not their fault but are instead due to what they perceive as systematic social hostility by women toward men.
We first consider why incels in such communities portray hostility towards women. Then we sketch out parts of incel ideology (in particular beliefs stemming from being 'red-pilled' or 'black-pilled') and show how this ideology helps to reconcile the hostility. We then, introduce echo-chambers, employing Nguyen's (2020, 'Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles') formulation. Lastly, we present examples of language used by incels and suggest that certain linguistic terms help to reinforce incel echo chambers by perpetuating misogyny; establishing social identities; and intra-group policing.
LUCIJA DUDA '“Why so angry?”: a feminist view on the oppressive language of arguing in Philosophy'
Some feminist argumentation scholars argue that overreliance on Govier’s (1999) minimal adversariality, i.e., the tendency to mitigate the opposition of views in philosophy through norms of politeness, renders impossible the access of marginalized philosophers to philosophy (Burrow, 2010; Hundleby, 2013; Yap, 2020). This is so because the stereotypes of politeness, which are gendered and raced, influence the performative force of the arguer’s speech act, so they find it difficult to produce a philosophical argument. Eventually, given the fact that uptake is constitutive of the speech act, they produce a different speech act altogether. For example, if a white woman affected by the ‘Angry Black woman’ stereotype, interprets a Black woman who raises a polite objection X as making an attack, a Black woman actually did produce an attack instead of an objection. To avoid the injustice that marginalized philosophers experience in minimally adversarial philosophical argumentation, feminist argumentation scholars suggested collaboration (Hundleby, 2013; Yap, 2020) as an alternative philosophical method, or the self-regulating policy of adopting metadistrust (Bondy 2010, Rooney 2012) towards one’s assessment of the arguments offered by marginalized arguers, especially if they are relevant to marginalized arguers’ oppression.
I argue that the framework which takes uptake to be constitutive of the speech act, which Yap and Hundleby endorse directly, but is also symptomatic of Burrow’s work, is ill-suited to describe the oppressive acts of arguing in philosophy. As the theoretical framework, the constitution theory of uptake is inappropriate for the political goals of feminist practice. Although the goal is to reveal how silencing disadvantages arguers belonging to marginalized social groups, the theoretical machinery of speech acts which appeals to the constitution theory of uptake (CTU) harms the speakers whose harm is designed to illuminate. First, I argue that a feminist framework which appeals to CTU perpetuates the stereotypical philosophical representation of people of colour as not endowed with reason, as aggressive, primitive, and emotional. In this way, it maintains the racialized and gendered regimes of representation in philosophy. Second, CTU deprives marginalized speakers of agency (McDonald, 2021). By depriving marginalized philosophers of the status of the agent, feminist argumentation theory ratifies the mainstream dominant boundaries of what counts as philosophy and who counts as a philosopher. Consequently, it lacks to recognize as philosophical and argumentative the non-traditional practices and knowledge locations which are important tools in reframing philosophical practice. Finally, given that the framework of speech act theory locates the harm as originating in the individual member of the audience or proponent of an argument, it is hard to perceive that harm originates on the level of structure or the level of the institution. This is politically unpalatable for feminist goals because the project which aims to inclusive philosophy should not rely on individual responsibility, but instead illuminate racism and sexism as structural philosophical problems, hence challenging the status quo of normative white philosophical spaces. I will show that this is why solutions to problems of injustice, such as metadistrust or collaboration, are flawed.
TAIWO OGUNYINKA 'Ontology, Ethics and Language in Social Justice Movements'
In exploring the topic of Ontology, Ethics and Language in Social Justice Movements, the research project 'Shifting Perspectives' asks how we can reflexively apply the knowledge learned to how we intentionally shape our relational dynamics through almost-live reflection. This speculative approach to research is grounded in positioning research as an intentional act aimed at shaping social dynamics, then applying feminist and Black feminist approaches to knowledge production and sharing. The talk will be an extension of this process, by presenting the rationale for my approach and how this has affected the knowledge gathered to date. Through the Q+A, I hope to engage in critique and reflection of the presented items as an intentional act of developing knowledge, then reflexively, briefly discuss as a group our thoughts on the whole session as an act of knowledge sharing and production. This talk will be a lived reflection on the topic of the talk itself.
PRICE
Free
REGISTRATION
To register please email Justina Berskyte (justina.berskyte@manchester.ac.uk). Please indicate whether you would like to attend in person or online.
