Departmental Seminar: Dr Stephen Ingram

Title

Abstract

The non-naturalist moral realist must explain how moral beliefs can be epistemically justified, for they take the truths that such beliefs concern to fall beyond the reach of empirical inquiry. Most non-naturalists adopt an ‘intuitionist’ picture on which justified moral beliefs are formed non-inferentially. This view can be developed in different ways, and the aim of this paper is to suggest a promising new direction for intuitionism. The motivation for going in a new direction arises from a question that (to my knowledge) intuitionists have yet to identify and address. I call this ‘the collaboration question,’ for it concerns issues that arise from the need to unite (a) the intuitionist claim that justified moral beliefs are a priori and non-inferential with (b) the fact that moral inquiry is a social activity that requires leaving the armchair to engage in empirical dialogue with others. I show how to develop intuitionism so as to resolves this tension. More specifically, I explain how a priori justified moral beliefs (and, in fact, a priori beliefs more generally) can be acquired through inclusive and cooperative dialogue. I show that this view – which I call ‘cooperative intuitionism’ – has further payoffs in illuminating how to handle at least three challenges facing intuitionism.

2.07
Humanities Bridgeford Street
Manchester

Dr Paula Satne