Philosophy Research Seminar: Alfred Mele (Florida State)
| Dates: | 27 October 2015 |
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| Times: | 15:00 - 17:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Alumni, Current University students |
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"Two libertarian theories: or why event-causal libertarians should prefer my daring libertarian view to Robert Kane’s view"
Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of two theses: the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism, and at least some human beings sometimes exercise free will (act freely). Some libertarian views – so-called event-causal views – appeal to indeterministic causation by events and states. This article explores the relative merits of two different views of this kind. One is Robert Kane’s well-known view, and the other is the “daring libertarian” view I floated in Free Will and Luck. I say “floated” because I am not a libertarian. I do not endorse incompatibilism; instead, I am agnostic about it. But if I were a libertarian, I would embrace my daring libertarian view. This paper’s thesis is that event-causal libertarians should prefer my daring libertarian view to Kane’s “dual or multiple efforts” view. Special attention is paid to a problem that luck poses for libertarian theories – a problem that Kane and I attempt to solve in different ways.
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Lecture Theatre A
Zochonis Building
Manchester
