MET Seminar - Aram Grigoryan
| Dates: | 23 October 2024 |
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| Times: | 17:00 - 18:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Current University students |
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Title: Robust Market Design under Opaque Announcements
Authors: Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller
Abstract: We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense: A property can be guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In contrast, in some environments, weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed under opacity.
Speaker website: https://sites.google.com/iset.ge/aramgrigoryan
Contact: david.delacretaz@manchester.ac.uk
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Boardroom 2.016
Arthur Lewis Building
Manchester
