MET Seminar - Christopher Sandmann (LSE)
| Dates: | 17 April 2024 |
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| Times: | 17:00 - 18:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Current University students |
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Title: Market Structure and Adverse Selection (joint with Dakang Huang)
Abstract: This paper presents a unified perspective on multi-contracting in markets afflicted by adverse selection. We subsume the polar cases of exclusive and nonexclusive competition by introducing the concept of a market structure: a trading rule that specifies the subset of sellers with whom buyers can jointly trade. Normative results single out the “1+1” market structure, where buyers trade with one seller from each of two subgroups. If adverse selection is severe, adopting the “1+1” market structure Pareto-improves upon the exclusive equilibrium allocation. When, in addition, purchases must include a contract exceeding a minimum quantity, the equilibrium allocation is second-best efficient.
Manchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule: http://daviddelacretaz.net/seminars/
Speaker website: https://sites.google.com/site/christopherpsandmann/home
Travel and Contact Information
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Boardroom 2.016
Arthur Lewis Building
Manchester
