MET Seminar - Ángel Hernándo-Veciana (Carlos III, Madrid)
| Dates: | 6 March 2024 |
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| Times: | 17:00 - 18:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Current University students |
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Title: The Market for Lemons under Regularity
Abstract: In this paper, we conduct an investigation on a competitive version of the market for lemons using the tools of mechanism design. Our main contribution is two fold. First, we provide regularity conditions under which the constraint efficient (i.e. second best) is particularly simple. It can be implemented either with a competitive equilibrium or a price floor with uniform rationing, depending on the strength of adverse selection and the elasticities of demand and supply. We also investigate optimal subsidies and quantity withdrawals and discuss the role of screening. Second, we introduce new techniques based on generalisations of mean preserving spreads/concentrations that are essential to derive our regularity conditions and that apply more generally to mechanism design problems.
Manchester Economic Theory (MET) schedule: http://daviddelacretaz.net/seminars/
Speaker website: https://sites.google.com/view/angelhernandoveciana
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Boardroom 2.016
Arthur Lewis Building
Manchester
