MET Seminar - Omer Edhan (Manchester)
| Dates: | 11 March 2026 |
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| Times: | 17:00 - 18:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Current University students |
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Title: Lyapunov Games
Authors: Omer Edhan Idan & Ziv Hellman
Abstract: Decentralised learning is often used to explain how play might settle on equilibrium, but even natural adjustment rules can produce persistent cycling. We identify broad conditions under which learning in population games does converge. The key idea is a global “progress measure” - a strict Lyapunov function - that increases along learning paths, rules out cycles, and forces long-run behaviour to settle at equilibrium. We study when such Lyapunov functions exist, linking convergence to the absence of robust non-equilibrium (chain) recurrence. We also give practical, verifiable sufficient conditions via a Helmholtz-type decomposition that separates convergent and cycling components, yielding convergent dynamics well beyond the potential-game framework. Time permitting, we discuss implications for equilibrium selection and directions for applied work.
Contact: sophie.kreutzkamp@manchester.ac.uk
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Williamson_4.08 Seminar Room
Williamson Building
Manchester
